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Abstract
In this commentary we propose four questions to be addressed while building a meaningful public primary
healthcare response in Lebanon today. These questions emerge from two imperatives: the necessity to consider
both short- and longer-term struggles in a context of protracted conflict and the need to protect public health as a
public good whilst the public Primary Healthcare Network (PHCN) is facing the Covid19 pandemic. In order to
identify how these questions are related to the need to be working short and long, we look at the imprints left by
past and present shocks. Profound shocks of the past include the Lebanese civil war and the Syrian refugee crisis.
We analyse how these shocks have resulted in the PHCN developing resilience mechanisms in order to ensure a
space for healthcare provision that stands public in Lebanon today. Then, we consider how two present shocks --
the economic breakdown and the blast of ammonium nitrate in Beirut port -- are affecting and threatening the
progress made by the PHCN to ensure that primary healthcare remains a public good, a fragile space acquired with
difficulty in the past half century. We identify what questions emerge from the combined consequences of such
traumas, when the immediate constraints of the present meet the impediments of the past. We consider what
such questions mean more broadly, for the people living in Lebanon today, and for the PHCN ability to respond to
the Covid 19 pandemic in a relevant way. Our hypothesis is that in a protracted conflict, such as the one defining
the circumstances of Lebanon now, public access to primary healthcare might persist for the people as one
safeguard, in which social and moral continuity can be anchored to protect a sense of public good.
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Background
Protracted conflicts arise from multiples of existential
shocks—active armed conflicts (non-international or
international), social strife resulting from poorly resolved
past conflicts, governmental collapse, system-wide eco-
nomic failure, hostile invasions, mass refugee influx,
massively destructive disasters, large-scale internal dis-
placement occasioned by local conflict or climate-driven
assaults on livelihoods, and, rarely, pandemics. These
shocks may occur sequentially or at times accumulate in
a short time frame, often because they may be related to
or may increase the negative dynamics of previous
calamities. The humanitarian community is only just
beginning to recognize these complexities and their im-
plications for relief and development. These questions
were recently examined (by the International Committee
of the Red Cross) to identify key characteristics of any
protracted conflict [1]. All of these key characteristics
are active in the case of Lebanon [2–4]. A protracted
conflict claims longevity, either as one that persists for
decades or one that merges and entangles with others
that develop within one country. A protracted conflict
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fragments and mutates, engaging new armed groups,
political factions, disruptions, and forces a re-framing of
priorities for positive intervention. It arises episodically,
with spikes of distress or violence that are not of equal
intensity. It is internationalized, prompting other States
to intervene in various forms. It imposes a cumulative
impact, wherein infrastructure is degraded, utilities and
services decay, social capital erodes, and living condi-
tions decline. It induces pervasive fragility of governance
and reduced capacity to withstand economic and polit-
ical shocks or massive disasters. And over time it inten-
sifies the suffering of its people, who move to escape one
shock and then another, resulting in a rising number of
impoverished people moving within or beyond national
borders.
The interactive relationship between protracted con-
flicts and public health has been described in the past
decades, including the direct and indirect consequences
that conflicts impose on health, as well as the notion of
“breakdown” of societies where civilians bear the heavi-
est part of the burden [1, 5, 6]. In protracted conflicts
the efforts undertaken necessitate dealing with broken
human receptive capacities, at a pace that requires stem-
ming the worst impact of the immediate disasters, when
many aspects of the society have been damaged for a
long time. In this paper, the simultaneous focus on
meeting immediate needs and on alleviating the deep
cumulative impact is referred to as the necessity to be
“working short and working long” [1]. From this per-
spective, the role of a public health system can rapidly
become compromised but also may persist as an import-
ant beacon of hope and of an aspirational value given to
human life. The peer-reviewed literature on this topic is
scant but includes insights captured in accounts of hu-
manitarians and human rights observers in wars and cri-
ses, as well as in historical accounts of protracted
conflicts (including the many post-colonial wars) arising
in the decades after World War II.
One major constraint of the literature on this subject,
however, is the difficulty of measuring events as they
happen, forcing a reliance on retrospective accounts.
Real time questions related to the public health decisions
that have to be made as a deep multi-faceted crisis un-
folds can be explored in Lebanon today [2, 4]. These
questions relate to the need to understand the trade-offs
embedded in any decisions taken to respond to Covid-
19 as the acute pandemic spreads while resource con-
straints continue to tighten for essential public health
services such as vaccinations, maternal and child health-
care, and support to those with non-communicable dis-
ease. This understanding is needed to discern how these
trade-offs are negotiated for both the short and long
term. Such negotiations will depend on prior resilience
mechanisms, how these might be disrupted by the
current crisis and how such mechanisms can be pro-
tected. Understanding the inherited fractures of the past
allows us to uncover the cumulative impact in a popula-
tion affected by different layers of crises; to identify
which essential health needs might be at risk and for
whom; to discern how the short and long term re-
sponses can possibly include the most vulnerable in both
phases; and to address the ethical questions embedded
in choices that must be made in a population-based
response [1]. This complex task now confronts those de-
livering public primary healthcare (PHC) in Lebanon.
Their approach, strategies, and compromises are ana-
lysed in this commentary.
Working long and working short
In this section we document the main past shocks that
the Lebanese primary health care network (PHCN) has
been dealing with since 1975. Then, we analyse how this
network has been frayed by present shocks. Finally, we
consider how the combination of both shocks confront
the public health system with significant trade-offs in
crafting an appropriate response to the Covid-19 crisis
pandemic--when the economy is collapsing, and the
Beirut port and half the city lie in ruins.
The scars of the past
Historically, the country’s autonomy has been periodic-
ally threatened by regional and international nation-
states [3, 7]. The pluralistic society of Lebanon has man-
aged to maintain a relative equilibrium in the midst of
such turbulent times. However, profound shocks such as
the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) and the Syrian crisis
(2011) have contributed to shape the Lebanese health-
care system in a very peculiar way. We describe some of
these characteristics below.
First, the shocks of the past have shaped a social or-
ganisation of healthcare along sectarian lines [3, 7, 8].
Following the independence of the country in 1943, the
National Pact imposed a sectarian distribution of gov-
ernmental power along the lines initiated during the
French mandate [7]. At the end of the Lebanese civil
war in 1990, the country’s governance structure recapit-
ulated the same sectarian divisions in the Taef Agree-
ment [7]. This distribution of political powers has
become over the years increasingly dysfunctional and
kleptocratic [3, 8]. Post-civil war reforms were proposed
by the MoPH to promote health and to protect the
population based on the Alma Ata Declaration [7]. Such
reforms embodied the attempt to maintain a public
space in which to resist the growth of the private and for
profit healthcare provision flourishing after the civil war
[7]. As these reforms struggled to take root in the midst
of political sectarian turmoil and repeated economic
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recessions, the funds allocated to the public health sys-
tem progressively decreased [7].
Second, the civil war forced the Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH) to rely on disparate non-state actors and
private providers [2, 4, 7–9]. In its post-war weakened
capacity, the MoPH had to accommodate to a hospital-
centred and specialized provision of care, under the in-
fluence of the private sector [2, 4, 9]. This long-standing
adjustment has left the MoPH with meagre financial
means, insufficient human resources, and little authority
to guide and coordinate the provision of public health-
care. Between 1998 and 2007, 25% of the MoPH staff
who retired were not replaced [7]. Due to conflicting
sectarian and private interests, the law to provide for
one single pool of funds to cover the entire Lebanese
population has never been passed [9]. Primary healthcare
has received very little funding within the MoPH budget:
It is estimated that 5% is allocated to prevention and pri-
mary healthcare services while 79% is used to reimburse
contracted hospital services [7]. These disrupted efforts
to establish an integrated approach have shaped frag-
mented sub-systems acting through separate mecha-
nisms to provide primary healthcare services to various
populations of interest.
Third, the shocks as they unfolded over the past de-
cades have progressively excluded a growing number of
groups of people from the costly for-profit provision of
healthcare [4]. The MoPH is the funder of last resort for
the Lebanese (over 50% of whom lack any forms of in-
surance) resulting in a heavy drain on public funds to
cover service contracts with private hospitals [2, 4, 9].
While national insurance schemes might cover prede-
fined outpatient services on a reimbursement basis for
Lebanese employed in the formal sector, most outpatient
services are financed by out-of-pocket (OOP) payments
for people not included in such schemes. The result is
that vulnerable Lebanese patients encounter financial
barriers to seeking any form of primary healthcare [7].
The chronically impoverished Palestinian refugees rely
on the 70 plus years of support from the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) covering most of
their essential health needs since 1948 [2]. The influx of
over one million Syrian refugees into Lebanon increased
the population by over 30%, adding another group of
people unable to afford the expense of private healthcare
[4, 10]. Based on its hard experience with Palestinian
camps, the Lebanese government set up a de facto “no-
camp” policy for Syrian refugees, which resulted in pla-
cing refugees in communities or existing systems which
were already weakened or failing [4, 9]. This strategy
meant that a population of over one million impover-
ished refugees had to be incorporated into a system of
care that was already struggling to meet the needs of
previously impoverished populations [2, 4]. As a result,
the percentage of Syrian refugees in the PHC network
increased from 12% in 2012 to 46% in 2018, an illustra-
tion of the impact of the Syrian crisis on the provision of
services at the primary level of care.
Fourth, the Syrian crisis also brought an additional in-
flux of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and do-
nors, resulting in further fragmentation of the systems of
care [4]. This increasingly complex network created
overlaps for patients as well as providers [4, 9, 11]. The
growing number and variety of players shaped the pri-
mary healthcare provision into an even more complex
array of intermingled actors over the years. As these dif-
ferent shocks have unfolded, the provision of public
healthcare has been squeezed into an underfunded and
fragmented set of arrangements for those too poor to
have access to the privatized for-profit providers of pri-
mary healthcare [4].
Fifth, the past shocks allowed important geographic
disparities to surface. Geographic disparities include
underserved areas along the borders which have been
traditionally inhabited by poor Lebanese and Syrian sea-
sonal workers [4, 12] and urban areas where a range of
impoverished groups (poor Lebanese, Palestinian refu-
gees, Syrian refugees) may have access to subsidized ser-
vices [11]. The arrival of Syrian refugees imposed a
drastic increase in the number of people to be accom-
modated in the most underserved areas of the system [4,
9]. To institute reforms such as a shift to preventive care
delivered by the PHC network was also a more difficult
task in these geographic areas where there existed few
options for curative care, thus reducing the capacity to
refer to a close higher echelon of care [9].
Sixth, the past shocks resulted in a sometimes unstable
and insecure pathway of access for all the patients who
could not afford the private and for-profit system. For poor
Lebanese, the prevailing pattern is a minimal government
provision of primary healthcare through a discounted rate
compensated by the MoPH through technical and in-kind
support. Lebanese employed in the formal sector benefit
from a combination of national funds and expensive private
care [2, 8]. Palestinian refugees are supported by UNRWA,
an agency that has been struggling to maintain funding
over time. For Syrian refugees, access to primary healthcare
is partly subsidized through a preferential rate compensated
by financial support from the UNHCR [4, 9]. However, the
support capacity of both UNHCR and UNRWA is facing
constraints and funding gaps [10], which might be wors-
ened in the future by the financial burden that the Covid19
pandemic is imposing on the economy of donor countries.
Resilience mechanisms to work long
Throughout the past decades of unrest, the MoPH PHC
department supported by a range of local and inter-
national actors created a space for collaboration beyond
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the sectarian lines and across the geographic disparities
inherited from the past. This amplitude for delivering
public primary healthcare services, expanding beyond
sectarian, gender, religious, geographic or political di-
vides, is referred to in this paper as the “space for public
health as a public good” in Lebanon. The creation of
such a space was achieved by ensuring a role for the
MoPH to coordinate an agreed-upon set of national
frames and standards for all autonomous PHC facilities
adhering to the network and was informed by a team of
grounded national and international actors believing in
public health principles [2]. Based on these principles,
the MoPH engaged to strengthen the capacity of the
PHC centres within the network through technical tools
such as trainings and guidelines, access to the PHCN
health information system, the inclusion into an ac-
creditation scheme and access to subsidies and in kind
supports. In return, PHC centres committed to provide
the basic services required by the MoPH at discounted
rate; to adhere to national health, safety and clinical reg-
ulations and standards; and to provide regular reports to
the MoPH. The national Primary Healthcare Network
(PHCN) was established in 1996 with 19 primary health-
care centres adhering to the network [7, 9]. Today the
network includes 237 PHC centres distributed across
Lebanon, serving over 1 million beneficiaries annually
including poor Lebanese and Syrian and some Iraqi and
Palestinian refugee populations.
To make it possible for the over one million Syrian
refugees to be hosted in Lebanon, the international com-
munity raised additional substantial resources which
were funnelled to the national government [9, 10]. Key
to this effort was the intent to reduce the tension be-
tween and among populations and to support the deliv-
ery of healthcare services in impoverished areas [4, 9,
10]. In terms of the PHC centres, some very important
clinical and administrative supports were provided to
mitigate the crisis effects on the most impoverished
Lebanese. These were funded by the European Union
and the World Bank to include proactively the vulner-
able Lebanese in the response to the crisis and struc-
tured to build a longer term program with a package of
subsidized care for PHC services for all population
groups [9].
Today the PHC network represents around one quar-
ter of all facilities providing outpatient care in Lebanon.
As a growing number of actors have been joining under
the MoPH leadership, a collective non-profit provision
of primary healthcare has been forged. Despite its lack
of direct capacity, the MoPH PHC team has shaped con-
vening mechanisms that aim at a fairer distribution of
resources which takes into account the essential needs
of the most vulnerable population groups described
above. The creation of a cohesive monitoring process
also supports the establishment of an information plat-
form where the data collected routinely can be analysed
and presented. This information platform creates a con-
crete public good and also embodies a way to maintain
an understanding of the reality and reach and gaps of
the public health enterprise.
Several difficult systemic issues in the PHC network
remain, however. These include the complexities of the
referral processes; recalcitrant gaps in matching profes-
sional services with patient needs at different primary
healthcare centres; an overall high level of staff turnover;
and challenges posed in trying to manage the drug sup-
ply chains in the network [7, 9]. These persistent diffi-
culties show that the national and international efforts
deployed have not been sufficient to decrease inequal-
ities and ensure access to basic health services for all the
most vulnerable and that the resilience mechanisms de-
ployed remain fragile [4]. The cumulative effects of the
division along sectarian lines, the privatization of health-
care, the lack of legal mandate and supervisory authority
to guide healthcare provision, and the very low resources
channelled towards ensuring field supervision and qual-
ity control have continuously undermined the aspiration
to make primary healthcare a common public good. Yet
the efforts deployed by the PHCN to build a people-
centred approach at the level of primary care [2, 4, 9]
have persisted and the weight of the past and current
crises has not extinguished the vision of Universal
Health coverage at the core of the MoPH PHC team
strategy [4].
The shocks of the present
In this section we consider how the fissures of the past
have undermined capacities to withstand the blows of
the present, as two unprecedented shocks battered the
country in less than a year apart. The first shock hit
Lebanon in October 2019 when the economic crisis de-
veloped into a full-blown economic collapse [13]. Loss
of confidence in the local currency led to effective de-
valuation of the market rate for the Lebanese Lira and
resulted in a debilitating financial crisis with a shortage
of stable foreign currencies within Lebanon’s economy
[13]. Unemployment rates skyrocketed as hundreds of
businesses closed down [3]. These developments in turn
created shortages in basic supplies and inflation in prices
of goods. Economic experts say Lebanon will experience
a deep recession and a double-digit contraction in the
economy equivalent to what the United States experi-
enced during the Great Depression [13]. The second
shock, in a country increasingly oppressed by a crum-
bling economy, was the blast that blew apart the Beirut
port on August 4, 2020. On that day, 2′750 tons of am-
monium nitrate left “lying around unsafely for the better
part of a decade” [3] exploded with ruinous force. The
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blast that struck the heart of the country is said to be
equivalent to 1/10 of the blast effects of the atomic
bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The powerful explosion
led to at least 180 deaths and an estimated 6000 people
injured [14]. Over 110 people remain missing and hun-
dreds of thousands of people have been left homeless in
the capital city.
We document below the cumulative effects of these
two brutal present shocks. We describe their dreadful
impacts on the MoPH readiness, on the population cap-
acity to adapt and on the longer-term dependencies that
combined might undermine the decades-long efforts to
protect primary healthcare as a public good in Lebanon.
Restrained capacities to work short
At the structural level, these two shocks have con-
strained further the capacity of the MoPH. The primary
healthcare sector has been badly battered by the eco-
nomic crisis on multiple levels. The economic collapse
has markedly reduced the ability to import essential
drugs, medical supplies, and equipment [2]. Access to
basic services such as water and electricity has been di-
minished due to shortages in gasoline and diesel result-
ing from the inflation, the shortage of stable foreign
currencies and the consequent inability to import from
abroad. Hospitals and healthcare facilities are unable to
operate at full capacity and are using their scarce re-
sources to maintain utilities (in terms of water and elec-
tricity) while accepting only patients in need of
emergency care and delaying routine operations.
Domestic funding for this sector has also been either
frozen or rescinded. Existing budgets allocated to the
national PHC network for procurement of vaccines,
chronic and essential drugs, and reproductive health
supplies are not being transferred or disbursed by the
Ministry of Finance due to lack of available funds. The
PHC department at the MoPH itself has not received
funding--and this has been the case for almost two years.
This absence of regular funding is leading to stock-outs
in medication at the level of the PHC centres. In order
to prevent discontinuation of medication at the level of
the beneficiaries, the government has temporarily shifted
the burden of procuring the medicine to the PHC cen-
tres and their related NGOs, for what is termed “the in-
terim stock-out period.” In addition, operational costs
for the PHC network are increasing while resources are
dwindling, particularly the electricity costs at the central
drug warehouse (essential to maintaining the cold chain)
and the transportation costs to conduct the quality mon-
itoring field visits. As for human resources at the PHC
department, funding has almost disappeared with the
existing team now only one third of what it was two
years ago. This reduction in staff leads to decreased abil-
ity to conduct quality follow-up within an increasingly
more stressed PHC network. At the level of the PHC
centres, operational costs have also drastically gone up.
The PHC centres are having to pay more in terms of (i)
supplies which are all imported on the dollar rate and
(ii) generators and back-up electricity required to com-
pensate for daily long outages. In addition, revenues
have gone down as poverty rates increase and beneficiar-
ies can no longer afford the already subsidized fees.
As a result, the PHC centres are resorting to measures
to decrease their operational costs in other ways such as
(i) giving half salaries or turning full time positions into
part time; (ii) stopping imports of expensive supplies;
and (iii) switching to more affordable supplies like chlor-
ine for sterilization instead of other disinfectants. If
PHCs are not able to procure the medical supplies by
themselves, patients are forced to undergo months of
service discontinuation. Qualified and unpaid health staff
are currently emigrating abroad to seek better opportun-
ities. PHC centres and NGOs are requesting an increase
in the consultation fee at the PHC network to match the
40% increase in payment to the private sector as an-
nounced by the Order of Physicians. This request has
been met with stark rejection at the level of the MoPH
which is keen on maintaining low fees and securing the
access of the vulnerable population to these essential
services. It is expected in the near future that some PHC
centres, particularly those in rural areas or run by small
NGOs, might close. Other large NGO-supported health
centres might merge with PHC centres to reduce costs.
In less than one year after the full economic collapse,
the unprecedented explosion in Beirut added another
deep blow to the MoPH service capacity [3]. Following
the blast, three hospitals, twelve primary healthcare cen-
tres and the MoPH main warehouse have been severely
damaged. When hospitals were not rendered partially or
completely dysfunctional by the blast and fires, they
were rapidly overwhelmed by injured people. The blast
has destroyed five out of seven UNICEF-supported vac-
cine cold rooms. Members of the MoPH team writing
this article tried to salvage 90% of the stock in the 72 h
following the disaster, with the support of UNICEF. The
violent destruction of these core assets contributes to
further disable the health system, already crippled by the
shortages in fuel, electricity, medical supplies, and water
which for months have been affecting both the private
and the public systems [2].
An increased number of people to support while working
short
Some projections of the effects of the economic collapse
estimate that poverty rates could rise to include more
than 45% percent of the Lebanese population, leaving
1.6 million people unable to afford food and basic non-
food items [2, 13]. Some estimations mention that by
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the end of 2020 poverty rates among Lebanese could
reach 75% of the population [3].
The drastic reduction of purchasing power as a result
of higher unemployment and rising prices has already
led to major difficulties in maintaining a minimum liveli-
hood [3]. As people struggle to make ends meet and to
procure basic food items, accessing healthcare services
has become a luxury and an increasingly larger propor-
tion of the population is priced out of even the subsi-
dized health care services. As the proportion of
impoverished Lebanese is rising, the populations at the
edge of poverty are more likely to neglect preventive
care or to try to self-manage their chronic diseases, since
clinic outpatient care is not covered at the point of care
by most private insurance schemes and is reimbursed
subsequently by the national security fund. As a result,
and in order to avoid spending money for preventive
measures, people delay seeking care until their condition
is critical and then they bypass the primary level to
present directly to hospitals where secondary care can be
covered by the MoPH for the most vulnerable Lebanese
or by the national fund if people are employed [2, 4]. Yet
in current circumstances, as unemployment rises and
Lebanese families inevitably lose their associated health in-
surance, the MoPH is now responsible for covering the
care of a much larger proportion of the population who
are presenting in an increasingly critical state. These
current circumstances reinforce the geographic disparities
and drive ever increasing complex and unstable pathways
to access care.
An increasing dependency on external supports while
working short
As an emergency response to mitigate some effects of
the economic breakdown, the MoPH is working with a
range of external actors. These include the EU- Madad
initiative (set up by the EU in response to the Syrian cri-
sis in the region) as well as UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO,
and UNHCR. These actors collaborate to fund the pro-
curement of the vaccines and drugs for the national
PHC network, which benefits both Syrian refugees and
the vulnerable host Lebanese population. These actors
are also playing a major role in the COVID-19 response
through procuring Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
for the PHC network response. The Beirut port explo-
sion also destroyed ten containers of PPE, which remain
essential for the national Covid-19 response. In response
to the Beirut blast, the MoPH along with national and
international partners developed the immediate relief
model (IRM) which aimed at subsidizing care for the
beneficiaries of the 21 PHC centres that were directly af-
fected by the blast. Although the international agencies
are stepping up to fill these gaps, these emergency mea-
sures create further dependency in Lebanon on external
funding in the public healthcare sector. This enforced
dependency may have spill-over effects in shaping the
funding, the role, and the coherence of the future pri-
mary healthcare response in Lebanon.
Covid-19 and the sharp drop in utilization observed in
the PHCN
At the outset of the COVID-19 epidemic in Lebanon,
the MoPH PHC team began to notice from the routine
PHCN monitoring data a decrease in patient visits for
essential services. An analysis of the evolution of the
utilisation rates per type of consultation was performed
between January 2109 and September 2020, as the
Covid-19 pandemic increased in intensity (Fig. 1). The
overall observation is that visits for essential services
during the strict lockdown period have declined by up to
70%, depending upon category.
Socially, economically, and politically, the situation has
now become much more complex since the first case of
Covid-19 was identified in Lebanon on 21 February 2020
[2]. The first complexity is a higher risk for Lebanese
services to become fragmented along sectarian lines in
the midst of the political turmoil and related social ten-
sions exacerbated by these shocks. The ongoing unrest
could trigger a massive withdrawal from the weakened
mechanisms for a coordinated management of the
multi-layered crisis and could lead to political parties
turning back to historic fault lines. Such a fragmentation
would further constrain the possibilities to develop cohe-
sive response measures and would limit the capacity to
understand by the agency of the multiple components of
the Lebanese health system, how Covid-19 is spreading
throughout the population. Such a fragmented approach
might also create pockets of populations left unattended
as the prior coordinated patterns of information and ac-
cess become disrupted. The pandemic trends in Lebanon
suggest that ascertainment issues (testing, contract tra-
cing, isolation) may be insufficient to contain the spread
of the virus. The efforts of the health system today may
converge towards taking care of the injured from the
blasts and the political unrest, re-constituting the hos-
pital infrastructure and ensuring treatment for severe
Covid-19 patients. The Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds
in the private system remain unaffordable for poor pop-
ulations and therefore are to be covered by the MoPH.
Another crucial constraint on anything but a short-
term perspective is the utter absence of effective leader-
ship and the reciprocal complete lack of citizen trust in
the capacity of the government. The population as a
whole, without an adequate spokesperson, might have
difficulty in clarifying to the humanitarian agencies,
coming in to act in an emergency mode to contain the
pandemic, the urgent need to protect primary healthcare
and preventive services and to protect public health as a
Hamadeh et al. Conflict and Health           (2021) 15:23 Page 6 of 9
public good. Social distancing measures might be more
difficult to implement among populations living in poor
and overcrowded environments, while the economic ef-
fects of confinement measures will most heavily affect
the people vulnerable economically and socially. The
pandemic has differentially affected previously impover-
ished areas including central Lebanon (encompassing
the city of Beirut) as well the North, the South, and the
Beqaa. The cases detected seem to have been occurring
in three successive waves, with a sharp increase in the
second half of 2020. An additional fundamental tension
is that the response to Covid-19 has made claims on the
material and human capacities of the health system in
terms of protective equipment, drugs, expertise, assess-
ment, triage, referrals, quarantine, inpatient treatment,
and coordination. But the health system today has much
less capacity than before the recent shocks, given the
blows it has suffered as discussed above.
Four essential questions to work short and long
Based on its historical mission, its current intent and the
challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, the PHCN
response strategy must ensure that the network can
meet the most urgent pandemic needs while maintaining
a coherent longer-term approach to support its historical
resilience mechanisms and protect the space for primary
healthcare as a public good in Lebanon. These mecha-
nisms include access to essential services for the most
affected, including now the people who have lost every-
thing in the economic collapse and in the explosions in
Beirut.
In order to work both short and long in a coherent
way, it is necessary to understand what role the PHCN
might play to support the Covid-19 response while
maintaining essential service functions for an increasing
number of vulnerable population groups, when hospitals
are now overwhelmed. It is necessary to frame the chal-
lenges posed by Covid-19 in the light of these inherited
difficulties, because in this framing, with insights from
the past and from the present, it is possible for the PHC
community to figure out how the trade-offs imposed by
these combined shocks are negotiated at the intersection
between the people affected and the capacities of the
PHCN system. It is also crucial for international and na-
tional actors engaged in making policies or framing a re-
sponse to understand whether such trade-offs are
addressed in ways that maintain the capacity and coord-
ination role of the MoPH and meet the needs of the
population to be covered. The empirical context de-
scribed above would suggest four sets of questions
pivotal to the PHC community in framing the appropriate
field response.
The first set of questions relates to the health sys-
tem’s capacity to detect, trace, refer and protect the
population from the specific risks that are posed by
Covid-19 in a complex and fragmented PHC net-
work, which is facing serious limitations to manage
the response in a comprehensive and systematic way.
Seasoned assessments from the health sector are
needed to understand what is currently feasible in
terms of identification, referrals, and coordination in
the current PHC network, in order to avoid a further
increase of Covid-19 cases.
The second set of questions relates to the capacities of
facilities in the network to deal with key gaps -- in hu-
man resources, laboratory capacities, supply chains and
essential stocks of medications and materials -- and
whether it is justified from an ethical standpoint in such
Fig. 1 Number of visits to doctor monitored between January 2019 and September 2020
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a situation to shift these scarce resources towards a
Covid-19 response at the level of the PHCN.
The third set of questions relates to the population
and the need to understand whether their most essential
primary healthcare needs can be met while focusing on
a Covid-19 response at the level of the PHC network.
This concern is crucial especially during the extended ef-
fort it will now take to mount an adequate disaster re-
sponse and meet the health and mental health needs of
the injured survivors, their families and the people
crushed by the economic breakdown. These issues re-
quire understanding the health and social impacts of not
meeting essential needs and the potential for social
breakdown that such decisions might entail in the longer
run. This third set of questions devolves into one main
one: Is failing to meet several essential needs in a trade-
off made to respond to Covid-19 actually an option in
the fragile social and disaster-stunned context of
Lebanon today?
The fourth set of questions relates to how the inter-
national supports to the economic collapse and the port
disaster are organized and channelled. The key question
here is whether such emergency supports take into ac-
count the broader picture: The need to prevent the
spread of Covid-19 cases as well as to ensure essential
access to services at the level of PHCs for all populations
trapped in this protracted conflict in the short and long
run.
Conclusion
Globally, Covid-19 has pushed health systems to their
limits [15]. In resource -constrained contexts where the
burden of disease and risk factors are often distributed
unevenly in the population, factors such as siloed finan-
cing and fragmented governance of the health system
may well have contributed to an increased burden on
the poor [15]. Today, service providers and policy-
makers worldwide are pressured to decide which essen-
tial services must be protected as precious resources are
reallocated [16]. Making sound decisions is even more
difficult in a context where political, economic or finan-
cial interests might well result in fragmented directives
that privilege the powerful and thus serve to increase
inequities [15].
Public health decisions and responses are anchored in
principles including the notion of justice and equity [17].
It has been recognized that around the world the poor
are experiencing more severe direct and indirect conse-
quences of Covid-19. To disregard the short- and long-
term effects of the pandemic may have costly impacts on
the society overall, as Covid-19 is affecting both the de-
mand for and the provision of essential services [15–17].
A one size fits all response is likely to cause great hardship
for those most in need [17]. In contexts where constrained
resources are now further dwindling, it is crucial to under-
stand the context of the pandemic, the capacities of the
health systems, and the needs of the community. In such
settings, the decisions made to control the Covid-19 pan-
demic could impose even more drastic and inequitable
short- and long-term consequences on health systems and
on populations affected [15–17].
In the case of Lebanon, important steps have been ini-
tiated in the past two decades to improve governance,
increase the financial support and reform the service de-
livery at the level of the public PHC network [9]. Today,
the local longer-term priorities might be ignored by the
international aid community in an attempt to avoid reli-
ance on the untrusted governmental structures [3]. Yet a
humanitarian response that does not protect the efforts
and the results reached over the past decades would fail
to preserve this hard-won public health space for the
most vulnerable populations. In Lebanon today, the
principles of public health might serve as the grounds
on which to build solidarity [15]. It is in these situations
where values are challenged that it is essential to ensure
that the aid responses are able to recognize the need to
include everybody while working short and long, along
the fissures left by the past and navigating within what
needs to be done today.
All these issues collide because Lebanon is deeply in
the midst of a protracted conflict and faces a pandemic.
The set of questions proposed are being incorporated in
an empirical field study to be conducted in collaboration
with field response actors. The answers to these ques-
tions will allow the MoPH PHC team to understand
whether, in the context of Lebanon, continued access to
essential healthcare proves to be pivotal for people as
they suffer from Covid-19; and whether that access is
valued in part because it sustains among the people a
sense of social security and continuity. These questions
link directly to how the PHCN might be able assert its
role as a guardian of the fragile space in which primary
healthcare will be maintained as a public good in
Lebanon not just for now but for tomorrow.
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